The Structural Challenges and Power Dynamics of the UN Security Council: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Use of Force Prohibition

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), established under the United Nations Charter (UN Charter) in 1945, is tasked with maintaining international peace and security. At the heart of this mission is the prohibition of the use of force, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits Member States from threatening or using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. The only two exceptions to this strict prohibition on the use of force are cases of self-defence or UNSC authorisation. However, despite this clear framework, the effectiveness of the UNSC in enforcing this prohibition has been consistently undermined by structural challenges and political realities. A key obstacle lies in the veto power held by the five Permanent Members (P5) of the UNSC — the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia. This unique power, originally intended to ensure cooperation among the major powers, has often resulted in deadlock, selective enforcement, and inaction, especially in cases where the use of force is involved. Indeed, the political and geopolitical interests of the P5 frequently diverge, complicating the UNSC's ability to act decisively in response to crises like the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the war in Syria, and past interventions in Iraq and Libya. We are, therefore, left with a faulty system that is prone to paralysis and P5 power plays and, as such, increasingly unable to enforce the use of force prohibition effectively.

Before delving into the structural challenges and power dynamics of the UNSC, it is essential to understand the legal foundations underpinning and surrounding the prohibition of the use of force. The general prohibition itself is contained within Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which states:

'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.'

Accordingly, the UN Charter mandates that all Member States shall refrain from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. Although the prohibition of the use of force is clearly codified in international law, there exist two exceptions by virtue of which the use of force may be justified. The first exception is the right to use force under Article 51 of the UN Charter as a means of individual or collective self-defence. Article 51 reads:

'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.'

The second exception to the use of force prohibition is found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Under this exception, the UNSC has the power to authorise the use of force in response to a 'threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression' in accordance with its authority to 'make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken, [...] to restore international peace and security' (Article 39 of the UN Charter).

The Veto Power: A Mechanism Prone to Paralysis and Selective Enforcement

One of the most critical features of the UNSC’s structure is the veto power held by the P5. According to Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, decisions of the UNSC require the affirmative votes of at least nine of the 15 members, including all five Permanent Members. As such, any one of the P5 can block substantive resolutions, including those that authorise military intervention or impose sanctions in a manner that ensures the enforcement of, and conformity to, the use of force prohibition. Historically, the veto power was established to ensure the cooperation of the major powers in maintaining peace and security in a post-World War II context. However, in today's political landscape, where P5 members increasingly prioritise their national interests, it often results in deadlock, preventing the UNSC from acting decisively to enforce the use of force prohibition.

For instance, Russia and China's (ab)use of the veto has been a significant barrier to UNSC action attempting to enforce the prohibition of the use of force during the Syrian Civil War. In 2012, Russia, together with China, vetoed a draft resolution that would have authorised military intervention in the case that the Assad regime failed to comply with demands for peace and protection of civilians. Furthermore, in 2017, Russia and China blocked a draft resolution that would have imposed sanctions on Syrian individuals and entities linked to the use of chemical weapons in cases where responsibility was established. Most recently, the Russian veto has played a crucial role in preventing the UNSC from enforcing the use of force prohibition in Ukraine. Just last year, on February 25, 2022, Russia vetoed a UNSC resolution that condemned its invasion of Ukraine and called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of Russian troops, and a return to diplomacy. The draft resolution also called for Russia's immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal from Ukrainian territory, emphasising support for Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the right of all States to live in peace within secure borders. In practice, therefore, Russia's veto effectively blocked the UNSC from taking action to halt the invasion of Ukraine, highlighting the ongoing challenges posed by the P5's veto power regarding the enforcement of the use of force prohibition.

The veto system has also contributed to the selective enforcement of the prohibition of the use of force. While the UNSC has authorised the use of force in some cases, it has failed to act in others. In 2011, for example, the UNSC authorised military intervention in Libya through Resolution 1973 (2011), citing the use of force by Muammar Gaddafi's forces against civilians. However, the subsequent NATO-led intervention, while initially authorised, exceeded the mandate given by the UNSC, resulting in regime change and destabilisation of the country. The 2011 Libya intervention, exemplifies how UNSC interventions can be inconsistent and manipulated based on the interests of the P5, such that they result in the illegal use of force. In contrast, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq took place without explicit UNSC approval. In this case, the UNSC withdrew a resolution authorising military action in Iraq, as it became clear that France, Russia, and China would cast 'no' votes on any new resolution, thereby vetoing it. This was due to their skepticism regarding the evidence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and concerns over the potential for regional destabilization. Despite a lack of consensus in the UNSC, a US-led 'coalition of the willing' proceeded with the invasion without authorisation, invoking the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter as a justification. However, given that legal experts have argued that the Iraq War was without justification and violated the UN Charter, it is rather reasonable to conclude that the UNSC not only failed to enforce the use of force prohibition but also failed to prevent an 'illegal' invasion.

The UNSC's failure to authorise the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and its inability to halt Russia's invasion of Ukraine, highlight how the outdated and flawed design of the UNSC, specifically the veto power of the P5, continues to prevent the effective enforcement of the prohibition of the use of force. This is especially true of cases that involve powerful states, like the United States and Russia — and, for that matter, other members of the P5 — who are willing to act unilaterally to advance their geopolitical interests.

Power Dynamics Among the P5: Diverging Geopolitical Interests, Strategic Alliances, and the Influence of the Great Power Rivalry

The P5 — the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China — hold a disproportionate amount of power within the UNSC. Whilst the structural architecture of the UNSC was designed to mirror the political realities of the post-World War II world (as previously mentioned), it creates challenges in today's diverse, multi-polar global order. The political agendas of the P5 often diverge, leading to inaction or inconsistent responses to global crises, especially when the use of force is involved. The United States, for example, often advocates for interventions aimed at promoting democracy, protecting human rights, or containing perceived threats through its 'Global War on Terrorism', and thus is generally more willing to approve the use of force (for example, Libya (2011)), or bypass approval altogether (as previously discussed in the context of the Iraq invasion (2003)). France and the United Kingdom share some alignment regarding humanitarian intervention, as both countries (the United Kingdom and France) support the principle of 'Responsibility to Protect'. However, both France and the United Kingdom are more sensitive to the risks of overreach and the unintended consequences of military action, as demonstrated by their skepticism regarding military intervention in Iraq.

Unlike the United States, Russia and China have traditionally been more cautious about the use of force, emphasising the importance of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations through their commonly adopted Declaration on the Promotion of International Law. Accordingly, Russia and China oppose interventions that they perceive as violations of sovereignty, as in Syria (also previously discussed). Nevertheless, it is important, particularly now, to point out the complexities of Russia's position on sovereignty and the use of force. Certainly, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, and its more recent invasion of Eastern Ukraine, are in stark contradiction to its purported stance and serve as clear examples of Russia using force to violate the sovereignty of a neighbouring State. Indeed, it would seem that the Russo-Ukrainian War proves that Russia manipulates the norm of state sovereignty to its own advantage by making it conditional on certain factors and much less universal; the concept of a multipolar oligarchy gives rise to the Russian concept that true power is possessed by only a few great powers.

These competing geopolitical priorities are exemplified by the ongoing great power rivalry between the United States, Russia, and China. The strong and strategic military, economic, and political alliances formed as a consequence of this division, often enable States to take matters into their own hands and exert military force without UNSC authorisation, to the extent that the prohibition of the use of force is largely irrelevant, and thus, not effectively enforced. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — an intergovernmental military alliance consisting of 32 member states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France — has enabled said States to act unilaterally during the Kosovo War in 1999 — during which the United States and other NATO members bypassed UNSC approval and launched an aerial bombing campaign aimed at halting the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding in Kosovo. Similarly, the strong, informal alliance between Russia and China to coordinate diplomatic and economic moves, has arguably facilitated the ongoingness of Russia's latest incursion into Ukraine, with Chinese state-owned defense companies providing military technology to sanctioned Russian government-owned defense companies.

The competing geopolitical priorities and lack of consensus among the P5 on the use of force, coupled with their strategic alliances and global power plays, have not only resulted in inconsistent responses to international conflicts but also encouraged and enabled unauthorised, unilateral military action. As such, the difficult power dynamics of the UNSC have undermined its credibility and hindered its ability to prevent and address violations of the use of force prohibition effectively.

Closing Remarks

It is clear that the structural challenges and power dynamics within the UNSC have significantly undermined its ability to effectively enforce the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. The veto power granted to the P5 has created a system prone to paralysis, selective enforcement, and inconsistent responses to global crises. Moreover, the P5's divergent geopolitical interests and strategic alliances stemming from the great power rivalry, not only often lead to deadlock and inaction, but also enable States to act unilaterally in contravention of the use of force prohibition. Whether it is Russia and China blocking action in Syria, or the United States and its allies bypassing UNSC approval in Iraq and Kosovo, the UNSC has repeatedly shown itself unable to act decisively to prevent and respond to violations of the use of force prohibition. The UNSC's current architecture reflects outdated post-World War II realities that no longer align with the complex, multipolar world order of today. Indeed, the increasing prevalence of unilateral interventions, selective enforcement, and regional power plays exposes the limitations of the UNSC in upholding its core mandate. Ultimately, the inability of the UNSC to reconcile the competing interests of the P5, combined with the continued manipulation of the veto system, weakens the credibility of the international system and diminishes its capacity to maintain global peace and security. Reforming the UNSC, particularly by addressing the role of the veto and ensuring more representative decision-making processes, is crucial to improving the UNSC's effectiveness in enforcing the prohibition of the use of force and fostering a more just and secure international order.

Robert Pixa is an LLB student at the University of Exeter. He is a passionate international law enthusiast as well as the founder and creator of MyLegalEye. The views expressed in this weblog are his own.